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My assignment is to consider the treatment of technical change in the
industrial organization literature and to discuss how I think the facts and
goals of technical advance should impinge on analysis of industrial
organization. Since the literature has been surveyed in several recent
books, I will concentrate on the second part of my assignment—key
issues that require rethinking and research.1 I shall be concerned par-
ticularly with problems in economic theory—the basic conceptual frames
that researchers in the industrial organization field have to work with.
My remarks will be focused on three main topics: first, the firm as an
innovating and adaptive organization; second, the operation of market
competition and other (including nonmarket) command and control
mechanisms in a dynamic environment; third, some problems of public
policy in sectors and situations where technical change is important. In
all of these areas I will be crudely summarizing, and anticipating, ideas
that Sidney Winter and I are developing.2
'Seefor example E. Mansfield, The Economics of Technological Change,
New York, Norton, 1968; R. Nelson, M. J. Peck, and E. D. Kalachek, Technology,
Economic Growth, and Public Policy, Washington, Brookings, 1967; and the
relevant chapters in F. M. Scherer, industrial Market Structure and Economic
Performance, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1970.
2Someof the discussion rests heavily on earlier work. See Winter's "Economic
Natural Selection and the Theory of the Firm," Yale Economic Essays, Spring
1964, and his "Satisficing, Selection, and the Innovating Remnant," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, forthcoming. See my "Uncertainty, Learning, and the
Economics of Parallel R & D Projects," Review of Economics and Statistics,
November 1959; "A Diffusion Model of International Productivity Differences,"
American Economic Review, December 1968; and Nelson, Peck, and Kalachek,
Technology.
Note: The author is indebted to M. J. Peck and R. E. Evenson for helpful
comments, although they are implicated in no way. Sidney Winter is responsible
for the good ideas.Industrial Organization 35
THEFIRM AS AN INNOVATING AND
ADAPTIVE ORGANIZATION
The theory of the firm exists on at least two analytic levels. At the
formal level the postulates a set of rather simple characteristics
of an archetypal firm. The formal theory rests on a deeper body of
thought, which I shall call "appreciative" theory, and which attempts to
structure qualitative notions about the nature of the firm and its activities
in a manner generally less rigorous but richer than at the formal level.
The theory of the firm at the simpler, more formal, level has a sharper
analytic cutting edge than appreciative theory, and is more capable of
generating, or proving, implications. However, the premises and argu-
ments used to specify arid justify the formal models rest on appeal to the
more basic appreciation of the firm. Further, much of applied research
in economics is guided by the appreciative theory at least as much as by
the formal theory. This certainly characterizes much of the research in
industrial organization. It is my contention that many researchers in the
industrial organization field are working with an appreciative theory
that is quite different from that underlying our formal textbook models.
They recognize this and somehow feel guilty about it.
To put it bluntly, I do not think that the traditional theory of the
firm is adequate for analysis of industries in which technical change is
important. I think that the appreciative theory of the firm used by in-
dustrial organization economists is better than the appreciative theory
of the full-time and, further, provides a good basis for formal
theory of an interesting and useful sort. The points I will make abut on
the long-standing debate about the theory of the firm—behavioralism,
managerialism, and so forth—but perhaps even more they are Schumpe-
terian. I will begin by questioning our traditional theory of the firm at
the appreciative level, and then go on to ask some questions about what
it is legitimate to assume about firms in the simple, formal models used
in the theory of industrial behavior.
In traditional appreciative theory the firm is viewed, first of all, as
a unit; I will not argue about this point here, but some of my later re-
marks are strengthened if one recognizes that within the firm there are
many people and subbrganizations that must somehow be organized.
Second, the behavior of the firm is viewed as subjectively rational, in the
nontrivial sense that the firm has some objectives in mind and some
rather firmly held realons for doing what it is doing (at one extreme
calculations, at the other arguments based on experience). The firm's36 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
behayior is viewed as objectively rational in that it would not be trivial
for an economist who understands the decision problem to find signifi-
cantly better policies for the firm than those being chosen.3 Third, the
firm is viewed as being able to operate a variety of technologies reliably
and efficiently, subject to the constraint of availability of the necessary
inputs (including machinery, skills, etc.). However these constraints
are assumed to be not particularly binding over the time period relevant
to the analysis. Hence the firm is viewed to a first approximation as
being able to employ effectively any technology that any other firm
can. I have asserted these elements of appreciative theory in a dras-
tically terse way, while in fact the theory is laden with complexity,
nuances, qualifications, and exceptions. I maintain, however, that this
is a fair characterization of those aspects of the theory to which we
appeal in constructing more formal models.
Once one begins to move from appreciative to formal theory this
vision of the firm leads naturally to a model that assumes firms maxi-
mize some objective (the deeper theory does not necessarily imply
profit) subject to the constraint of a production function and demand
and supply equations. Since subjective and objective maximization are
the same, the firm can be expected to behave according to the optimiz-
ing rules the economic analyst computes. The deeper model almost
suggests that all firms are pretty much the same or, rather, provides no
reasons why they should be different, and in the absence of special
reasons for postulating differences in technological capabilities, access
to markets, or of motivation this generally is what we end up assuming
3The"subjectively rational" concept means different things to different people,
but almost everyone would rule out basically random behavior. Although Aichian
and Becker attempt to show that even in this case some of the theorems go
through, their proposals do not seem intended as a serious assertion about the
nature of firm behavior (Armen Alchian, "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic
Theory," Journal of Political Economy, June 1950; Gary Becker, "Irrational
Behavior and Economic Theory," Journal of Political Economy, February 1962).
At the least some kind of consistency of behavior is expected. And most economists
would assume that this consistency is purposeful and is the result of some thought,
rather than being purposeless, mindless rigidity (although some use of rule-of-
thumb behavior would not be totally excluded). The "objectively rational" point
is different, and important. Despite Machlup's earlier insistence that the firm's
optimization must be considered as subjective, two things are clear. First, most
economists assume that the firm's perception of the world has some contact with
reality; firms are viewed as competent—a point I shall develop shortly. Second,
in the formal theory the economist plays God, and on the basis of his assessment
of what is objectively rational, makes predictions as to firm behavior.Industrial Organization 37
in the formal modeling. This is convenient because then we can proceed
with the business of modeling industry behavior on the basis of appeal
to a typical firm. Later on the theory generates various survival argu-
ments that can be to justify this assumption.
We end up with a theory which views the firm as a competent
clerk. This is so both in main-line positive theory and in normative
theory. Firms carry oui certain well-defined, widely known activities,
using generally available resources, picking the activities and their levels
according to easily computable (and optimum) decision
rules. In positive theory this characterization exactly fits competitive
theory under the case where all firms (including the potential
entrants) possess the same production sets. It is slightly inaccurate when
applied to oligopoly theory where firm differences in production sets,
supply conditions, and reaction functions are admitted in some models,
or to monopoly where the monopolist is de facto unique. But the theory
still gives the that one set of oligopolists, or one monopolist,
is pretty much like any other. In normative theory also the characteriza-
tion exactly fits the analysis of the optimality properties of competitive
equilibrium (with some awkwardness creeping in regarding oligopoly
when considering and development behavior), but the image
of the "interchangeable clerk" is strong throughout. This image of the
firm stems from our in our theory to take the technologies,
resources, and demands as given. Thus the economic problem is to get
the job done efficiently. Bread and automobiles are to be produced in
the right quantities and in the right ways given the preferences, re-
sources, and technologies available to the economy. (Let me ignore the
question of distribution.) A competitive market provides clear signals
as to what is to be done; following the signals is a straightforward busi-
ness.
This is a plausible of parts of the economic prob-
lem and might be a gçod overall characterization (with appropriate
market failure caveats) in a world of no real change; for example, the
circular flow world of Chapter I in Schumpeter's Theory of Economic
Development where "the data which have governed the economic sys-
tem in the past are familiar, and if they remain unchanged the system
will continue in the same way."This is also a world in which a variety
of plausible learning mechanisms vitiate the arguments that "tech-
J. Schumpeter, TheTheory of Economic Development,New York, Oxford
Paperback, 1961, p. 81.38 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
nological knowledge is not a public good" and "maximization is difficult
if not impossible," and in which Friedman-Aichian evolution-survival
arguments seem to make sense (with some important caveats that I will
not discuss here).
The circular flow concept, with mechanical, interchangeable firms,
probably can keep its footing, if shakily, in a world of smooth, pre-
dictable change—such as one with exponentially growing factor sup-
plies and consequent changes in demands. In some models technical
change is treated consistently with this view. Indeed, Schumpeter him-
self,in his Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, talks about the
"routinization of innovation" thus bringing technical change back into
his, now dynamized, circular flow model.5
However, even if technical change, and adjustment and accom-
modation to it, can ultimately be routinized, this certainly has not oc-
cuffed yet.6 Innovation is inherently creative and personal. In the world
of Schumpeter's Chapter III:
While in the accustomed circular flow every individual can act
promptly and rationally because he is sure of his ground and is
supported by the conduct, as adjusted to this circular flow, of all
other individuals, who in turn expect the accustomed activity from
him; he cannot simply do this when he is confronted by a new
task.
Carrying out a new plan and acting according tocustomary one
are things as different as making a road and walking along
Economic theory simply has not grasped this distinction. Perhaps the
most apparent and striking failure of theory is the proclivity to treat
research and development as merely another form of investment, with,
perhaps, an unusual amount of uncertainty. But this statement, at the
appreciative theory level, just does not characterize adequately the kinds
of experimenting, error making, partial correcting, and insightful or
blind behavior that seems to go on in major R and D. Nor does it appear
to be an adequate general characterization of firms that are trying to do
things they have not done before, even though other firms have. Recall
Particularly Chapters 11 and 12.
6Itwould be pedantic tocite many references here. But consider,for
example, the case studies in J. Jewkes, D. Sawers, and R. Stillerman, The Sources
of Invention, New York, St. Martins, 1958; and in J. Marschak, T. Glerinan, and
R. Summers, Strategy for R and D, New York, Springer Verlag, 1967.
Pp. 74 and 85.Industrial Organization 39
Henry J. Kaiser's unsuccessful attempts to master the automobile busi-
ness.8 Firms fail, and Our positive theory at the present time
does not seem to have toom for the kind of purposive but groping be-
havior that seems to the operations of firms in a regime of
rapid technical change.
Nor does our theory adequately deal with this. It is clear
that in many important sectors and situations not only is innovation
important, but it is an important part of what we want firms to do. To
hit this point hard let me shift focus here from the implicit context of
private goods and markets to the public sector, and broaden the con-
cept of firm to include organizations of unspecified legal form. In the
traditional public finance literature the task of the public bureaucracy,
plus contractors, is viewed as analogous to the task of the firm in com-
petitive theory—carrying out activities to provide public goods and,
more usually, services.et a large share of the important programs are
better viewed as efforts to solve problems, where the solution is likely
to require new hardware, or a new way of doing things, or a new pro-
gram, and, hence, "innovation" by the standard definition. Project Apollo
is the most striking example. Much of what we are trying to achieve in
defense procurement also is hardware innovation. Or, consider the War
on Poverty, where what we are mainly trying to do is find, and then
implement, programs that will work rather than operating existing pro-
grams (which are felt to be unsatisfactory).
I shifted to public sector activity because here itis easier to see
that quite often what we are asking the organizations to do is innovate,
rather than to meet a well-specified demand in an efficient and well-
known way. Yet clearly1this also characterizes what we expect and get
from firms in a large number of private goods, market-organized sec-
tors. While we hear more than enough about "progress being our most
important product," as theorists we have refused to absorb any of this.
Robert McNamara's statement is a bit flamboyant ('What in the end is
management's most fundamental task? It is to deal with change. Man-
agement is the gate through which social, political, economic, and tech-
nological change in every dimension—is rationally and
effectively spread through society" 9), but we do have to get at least some
of this flavor into our of the firm.
8 See "Arrival of Henry Kaiser" and "Kaiser-Frazer, Roughest We Ever
Tackled," Fortune, July 1951.
Remarks made at Milisaps College, Jackson, Mississippi, February 24,
1967; reprinted in 1.J. Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge, New York,
Atheneum, 1968, p. 76.40 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
The present main-line appreciative theory has no real room for
this dynamic concept, and industrial organization economists long have
known intuitively of this deficiency. In an environment of rapid tech-
nical change it is implausible to describe behavior in terms of concepts
like "subjectively rational"—except perhaps in the trivial sense that the
firm is trying to do as well as it can, has some clues as to appropriate
behavior, and if it clearly saw ways of doing better would be doing
them. But one would expect to find firms often having neither articulate
reasons nor appeals to experience to justify what they are doing, and
indeed being somewhat nervous about it.It certainly seems inappro-
priate to view behavior as being objectively rational in any nontrivial
sense. In particular there is no case for the assumption that the firm will
behave according to the rules the economist calculates as optimal. For
obvious reasons it seems a bad misspecification to assume that a firm
has access—over the relevant analytical period—to any technology to
which any other firm has access. For all of these reasons there is no
justification for sliding into the notion of a typical firm in a dynamic
environment. Indeed what appears important is that individual firms are
unique. In short, the firm cannot be viewed any longer as a competent,
easily predictable, interchangeable, clerk working in a well-structured
environment on well-defined tasks. Rather, the firm must be viewed as
attempting to keep its footing and to make progress in a poorly struc-
tured, changing environment by trying and doing appropriate new things.
At the level of appreciative theory, how should we characterize a
firm, ideally in a way that is consistent with the traditional perspective
where that is appropriate? Let me appeal here to the literature on or-
ganizational theory and the behavioral theory of the firm for justification
of a presumption that, whether as the result of rational analysis or not,
the firm at any time operates according to a set of decision rules that
links environmental stimuli to responses by the firm.'° In the traditional
theory it is analytically convenient to denote some aspects of these de-
cision rules as technological, and distinguish these from others which
can be characterized as higher-level decision rules. There are some seri-
ous difficulties with this clean split, but I will not go into these here. In
any case the theory of the firm aims for a convenient, and as simple as
possible, characterization of these decision rules. If this can be deduced
from, or assumed to be the result of, "maximization" it may be con-
venient, but it is not necessary to the theory as long as the analyst can
See R.Cyert and J. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1963,Industrial Organization 41
specify the rules somehow. Indeed, a perfectly viable theory would
simply declare the existence of these rules and certain aspects of their
form, and that they are stable and constant. This really is much of what
the maximization theory does. All that the maximization connotation
accomplishes is to make the specification plausible.
In the traditional theory these decision rules, both higher order and
technological, are viewed as capable of invoking a wide range of firm
responses to a considerable domain of environmental stimuli—prices,
etc. This is what makes comparative statics work. Let me again appeal
to the organizational literature to suggest that, rather, we should assume
that the built-in rules of a firm apply to only a small domain of
environmental conditions and are capable of invoking only a limited
range of responses. Put another way the firm at any time commands
only a small set of activities and has thought through responses to only
a limited range of market contingencies. This, it seems to me, should
be an explicit part of the theory.
The model of the firm needs two dynamic components. One is
specification of what determines the expansion or contraction of the
firm (the level of employment of the decision rules it is using). In other
words, the theory needs a submodel of widening investment.
In addition there needs to be an analysis of mechanisms that will
induce firms to change their decision rules. The assumption that the
firm's decision rules at any time are limited and simple means that in
an environment of change, either of external market conditions or of
perceived possibilities, the firm often will find itself in
situations where its built-in rules are, or are felt to be, inappropriate. In
our analysis of the process by which firms change their dec.ision rules
(perhaps higher order as well as technological) it seems important to be
much more sophisticated than we have been about modeling two differ-
ent, although far from independent, kinds of mechanisms. One essen-
tially is the processes of assessment and search that are largely internal
to the firm. An example is research and development, but I
also would include operations research, market analysis, management
contemplation, etc., where the firm is scrutinizing its own operations and
searching for ways to improve them. It seems useful to me to distinguish
these internal and search processes from another, undoubt-
edly linked, class of activities focused on the conduct of other firms. In
this latter class the firm is looking to sources of improvement by examin-
ing the behavior of other (presumably successful?) firms. While the
internal search and the external scan mechanisms clearly should be re-42 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
lated at the level of appreciative theory, at the formal level the first class
can be viewed as generating innovations (not necessarily improve-
ments); and the second class, diffusion models. While the purpose of
these activities is to improve performance I think it would be a grave
mistake to assume that they do so reliably. Nor does it seem appro-
priate to assume that these mechanisms are working all the time on the
full range of firm activities and procedures. Indeed, characterizing what
things capture the attention of the intelligence mechanism and "turn it
on," and the nature of the search process would seem to require theo-
retical delicacy, and much empirical investigation.11 Clearly firms differ
in these characteristics.
The explicit recognition that many of the decision rules, perhaps
particularly the technological ones, are subject to more than very occa-
sional change reduces the attractiveness of a theory that appeals to
stable decision rules. I would like to propose, however, that in an en-
vironment of rapid change where the lower-order rules may be quite
unstable, one might hope to find more stability in the qualitative "meta-
rules" that guide changes in the rules. Thus, one might well be able to
identify and describe the intelligence mechanism of a firm, its R and D
style, and the broad strategy that guides its search for improvements.
These surely are more difficult to describe in a simple way than the
kinds of rules that have been uncovered on, for example, pricing. But at
11 One obvious characterization is the "satisficing" model which, in a stylized
version, assumes an on-off switch mechanism linked to the performance of the
firm relative to its "aspirations" level, and an incremental search starting in the
neighborhood of existing practice. Contrary to many complaints about this charac-
terization it certainly does seem a basis for rigorous formal modeling. However,
it seems inconsistent with the practice of highly profitable firms to continue to
do considerable R and D; it does not adequately model in either the "switch"
or the "search" sense the looking to other firms that seems to characterize
"diffusion" processes, and it seems unable to account for "major" innovation.
Clearly there are much more sophisticated models of attempted rationality
than the simple satisficing model. What is required of theory, I suggest, is that
the model not require the decision maker to know more than the model shows
he can find out, and that the costs of information gathering and processing be
considered at least implicitly. W. Baumol and R. Quandt make some of these
points in arguing for the rationality of rules of thumb ("Rules of Thumb and
Optimally Imperfect Decisions," American Economic Review, March 1964). In
several of his works Stigler has generated some very interesting deductions from
models that are explicit about the processes by which information and "clues"
get acquired. And, of course, J. Marschak has been making some of these points
for years ("Theory of an Efficient Several Person Firm," American Economic
Review, May 1960).Industrial Organization 43
the level of appreciative theory it does seem plausible that firms can be
characterized in these dimensions in an illuminating way. Further, it
seems plausible that it is at this level that we can find and characterize
the sensible response to change characterizations of firm behavior (for
example, if wage rates rise significantly, search for ways to cut down
use of labor) that we so hard to deduce from our optimization
models. One does not need an optimization model to predict sensible
behavior.12
Some industrial organization economists, writing about important
firms in industries characterized by rapid technological change, have in
fact been applying something like this kind of an appreciative theory.
They have been digging into and trying to characterize pricing policies
and investment rules, without really trying to deduce these from opti-
mization assumptions. Differences among firms have been a matter of
some interest to researchers. In some of the literature there. have been
attempts to characterize the R and D philosophy of a firm or its overall
strategy.13
Thus the nontraditipnal appreciative theory apparently meets the
test of serving as a useful framework for empirical investigation. How-
ever, one cannot rest comfortably with an appreciative theory unless one
sees what a formal theory consistent with it would look like. In the first
12Notethat "neoclassical" implications of a wage increase probably can be
deduced even from a simple satisficing switch, incremental search model. The
wage rate increase decreases profits which (if they were "normal" before) flips
the search switch and will be found on the capital-intensive side of
the existing factor mix decision rule. Note that the larger the wage increase the
larger the substitution that will be generated (under plausible assumpions) before
target profit levels are again achieved.
Note also an "asymmetry" (perhaps realistic?) of this mechanism. A fall in
the price of capital will not flip the search trigger. A "never completely off" switch
assumption seems necessary to assure neoclassical results in this case.
Note also that itwill take time before the new equilibrium will be found
and, depending on one's there will be costs of searching and per-
haps mistakes. I take it that there is increasing interest among theorists in treating
adjustment lags and costs explicitly. By and large the justification has been in terms
of expectations or friction. The kind of explicit search model I have been dis-
cussing seems richer.
See,for example, Cyert and March, Behavioral Theory, Chaps. 7 and 10;
and A. Kaplan, J. Dirlam, and R. Lanzellotti, Pricing in Big Business: A Case
Approach, Washington, Brookings, 1958. On the question of corporate strategy see
Alfred Chandler, Strategy and Structure, Garden City, New York, Doubleday-
Anchor, 1962; and Neil Chamberlain, Enterprise and Environment, New York,
McGraw-Hill, 1968.44 Research: Retrospect and Prospect
place, while appreciative theory is inherently somewhat fuzzy, having
and working with a formal theory serves to keep the fuzziness within
bounds, and to sharpen the appreciative theory. Second, as will be
elaborated shortly, the theory of the firm is mainly used as a component
of the theory of industrial behavior, in which a more concise, formal,
and manipulable model of firm behavior is needed. Thus it seems im-
portant to develop a formal theory of the firm consonant with the appre-
ciative theory sketched above.
What is required is a formal theory of firm behavior that is consist-
ent with traditional appreciative theory when appropriate, yet is also
capable of modeling the innovative and adaptive firm where that is appro-
priate. The guidelines are clearly specified in the appreciative theory.
The firm at any time should be described by its size and the decision
rules it is following. These rules determine whatever endogenous vari-
ables the theory aims to explain as a function of a variety of external
variables. The firm also needs to be characterized in terms of its expan-
sion and contraction rules and, to anticipate the theory of industrial
behavior, the conditions that would trigger entry of a firm that is not
in the industry should be specified. Several models of this sort already
However, for a model really capable of generating and respond-
ing to technological change, it seems essential to incorporate the two
kinds of learning processes discussed above; some kind of an innovating
or internal search mechanism for improvement, and soñie kind of an
imitation mechanism whereby what one firm does can induce another
firm to do likewise.15 A variety of specifications might be employed.
However, it seems essential that at least the innovation generating
mechanism not be specified as objectively rational.16 The burden of
prediction that the system move in an objectively rational direction
should rest on specification of the search mechanism, on the diffusion
machinery, and on responses to market pressure. It would appear that
such a theory can be built, and is capable of generating some interesting
and plausible implications. The merit of such a formal theory, as sug-
14 The most elegant model of this sort is Winter's "Satisficing, Selection, and
the Innovating Remnant." But several of the stochastic growth models are similar
in many respects. See, for example, E. Mansfield, "Entry, Gibrat's Law, Innova-
tion, and the Growth of Firms," American Economic Review, December 1962.
15 Winter's model does have a simple innovation mechanism.
18 My insistence on this point is stronger than that we must have room in our
model for autogyros and Edsels. It has to do with the whole way we look at the
technical change process. I will elaborate what I mean in the last section of this
paper.Industrial Organization 45
gested above, is to be found at the level of our theory of the
industry, to which I turn.
DYNAMIC MARKET COMPETITION AND OTHER FORMS
OF INNOVATION: GENERATING AND SELECTING
ENVIRONMENTS
Economists, particularly industrial organization economists, seldom are
interested in the behavior of particular firms, but rather in the behavior
of industries or sectors. The sector usually, but not always, comprises a
number of firms whose behavior cannot be assumed to be independent.
Further, the dimensions of sector behavior in which we are most inter-
ested usually involve,an essential if often summary way, specification
of what is going on outside the particular group of firms that constitutes
the sector. We have a tradition of viewing firms as means, not ends.
Thus, in our theory of industrial behavior we are concerned with the way
in which demands for the output of the sector get generated, and the
extent to which the sector satisfies these demands. We also have an
appreciation of equilibrium considerations even in our partial
equilibrium analysis. Thus, we are concerned with the costs of operating
the sector at various levels and ways, the extent to which the sector
operates to minimize real costs at any level of operation, and the way it
balances marginal and costs.
Therefore, in conceptualizing at the industry level we generally
employ a greatly stripped down and simplified theory of the firm. In
addition to specification: of the characteristics of firms, our theory of the
industry or sector, at both the appreciative and the formal modeling
level, involves specification of the environment within which firms oper-
ate. The "market" in traditional theory is a model of such an environment
which determines the signals, incentives, and constraints which impinge
on firms and thus on their behavior. In the traditional theory the environ-
ment is determined by two classes of factors. One is the behavior of the
outsiders, particularly those who demand the good or service the firms
in the sector can provide, and those who supply inputs which have alter-
native uses or values. The other is behavior of the internal system taken
as a group—the competition that goes on among the individual firms.
Thus the market is at a connecting link between demanders and
suppliers of both and inputs, and a constraint upon the be-
havior of the insiders, in short, an apparatus of command (through
effective demand) and jontrol (through competition). There are many46 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
other kinds of command and control structures, such as those that
characterize primary education, medicine, or the foreign policy estab-
lishment. Now, in speaking of industrial organization, I assume that
"organization" refers to the command and control structure and that
although we tend to concentrate on markets (just as we have tended to
concentrate on firms which aim for a profit) the subject matter of indus-
trial organization in principle includes nonmarket command and control
structures and organizations with objectives defined in terms other than
profit.
I make these more or less obvious remarks so that we can be clear
that the traditional appreciative theory of industrial behavior in a market
environment is a special case. In the traditional theory the signaling and
incentive generation mechanisms are modeled as well-perceived product
demand and factor supply curves. The internal control environment is
deduced from the condition that no firm can improve its profit condi-
tions. Clearly our modeling of sectors which are not controlled by the
market would be somewhat different. However, our analysis of market
and nonmarket sectors has been dominated by notions of steady state
equilibrium associated with our notions of firms as clerks working in a
well-defined and relatively constant environment.17
The discussion in the preceding section suggests that this positive
theory does not adequately characterize the environment of firms where
technical change is rapid. The assumption of a well-perceived demand
curve for product or supply curve for input is plausible only if one can
describe mechanisms whereby these curves in fact get well perceived.
This would seem to imply considerable experience on the part of the
firms in the industry in the relevant environment of demand and supply
conditions. This clearly cannot be assumed in an environment of rapid
change in either demand or supply conditions. In particular, it seems
completely implausible in considering the demand for a major innova-
tion. Nor under these conditions does it seem plausible to model the
environmental constraints in terms of industry equilibrium for that is
not where the action is going on. If the industry or problem we are con-
cerned with looks like one in which we can expect change in the equilib-
rium conditions that is rapid relative to the speed with which equilibrium
is approached, or even in which one doubts that equilibrium (perhaps
17Thevarious "voting" models clearly are in this spirit. It turns out that in
these models very often an equilibrium does not exist. But this analysis—the way
the problem is set up—is virtually identical to the setup for analysis of market
equilibrium.Industrial Organization 47
constant) will be closely approached during the relevant time interval,
one should not play equilibrium games. Rather one has to work with an
explicitly dynamic model of firm and industry behavior. The competitive
environment of any firmis provided by the others moving toward
equilibrium, but not presence there.
The problem is not just in positive theory as a framework for
description and explanation; it is in normative theory as a framework for
evaluating If doing things better is a good part of what we
are trying to call forth, the market cannot be conceived of strictly as a
mechanism to "control (which is the image of Langian socialists
as well as of neoclassical economists who believe that actually having
competition may be easier than getting the decision rules of competition
followed in the of real competition). Rather the market has to
be viewed as a mechanism stimulating new mutation (innovations) and
doing a creditable job of somehow discriminating between the good
and the bad, spreading the former and killing the latter. Even in an
environment where rapid technological change is occurring and is highly
valued, this is far from a market control system.
In addition we want that system to stimulate and enforce the neoclassical
virtues of economic i.e., achieving an appropriate level of out-
put and a minimum economic cost. But since these are going to be
changing over time, here, too, market control must be viewed in terms
of stimulating moves in, the right direction.'8
Again let me focus on public sector activity to hammer home the
point—as well as to a policy issue that I will treat in the fol-
lowing section. The 190's marked the burgeoning of interest in systems
analysis (or cost-benefit analysis or any of a number of titles) as a tool
for governmental decision making. Thinking of the decision maker (the
systems analyst? the Cabinet Secretary? the President?) as commanding
a bureaucracy under him led to a sharp split between the public finance
literature, where (decisions) automatically were fulfilled, and
the industrial organization literature, where demands had to draw forth
responses by impinging on a (market) environment of potential sup-
pliers. As experience accumulated, the clean lines that once used to
exist between industrial organization and public finance have been de-
stroyed. There has beep growing appreciation that getting the program
18Istate these hack9eyed points here not for novelty value but simply to
point out that most of cçntemporary formal theory continues to ignore them.
There are exceptions, William Nordhaus's recent book, for example, invention,
Growth, and Welfare, Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1969.48 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
performed (the demand met) required the appropriate responses on the
part of a variety of organizations, public and private. It became increas-
ingly apparent that this was no trivial requirement.19 Getting the educa-
tion or health industries to do what the federal government wants it to be
doing turns out to be extremely hard. Part of the difficulty here is that
the federal government is only one of many who are trying to get the
system to do what they want. But President after President has found it
difficult if not impossible to get the State Department to do what he
wanted.2° The point I am trying to make is that having a well-working
command and control structure over a group of firms is no trivial matter
and that nonmarket sectors have the same command and control problems
as the market sector.
However, note that to a considerable degree where the nonmarket
sectors seem to be falling down is in effective adaptation to change—
technological and other. The education sector has failed to develop
appropriate responses to the rise in teacher salaries which, we had hoped,
would generate some effective search for ways to increase the pupil-
teacher ratio through increased capital intensity or more efficient tech-
niques of teaching. It has failed abysmally to respond to the changing
nature of the demands put upon it, largely learning how to educate poor
children with non-middle-class values, but also how to educate bored
middle class youngsters and how to operate integrated schools. Similarly
the health sector has not learned to respond to rising physicians' salaries
and fees, and the changing nature of demands put on it.
The neoclassical allegory does not seem to characterize these and,
I suggest, most other important kinds of responses to changing factor
prices and demands that we want of an economic sector and get out of
some. As stressed in the first section, that allegory implies much more
complex decision rules keyed to a richer domain of external
situations and range of responses than we have any reasonassume.
For large changes in, say, relative factor costs or demands, I do not think
that we can assume firms have a response already thought through or that
they can think through to a response ex ante that is subjectively and
objectively rational. Rather the response has to be considered as an
innovation which may or may not turn out to be really economic or
really responsive.
See,for example, thelast chapter of Charles Schultze's Politics and
Economics of Public Spending, Washington, Brookings, 1969.
20Fora very interesting discussion of bureaucratic versus optimizing behavior
see Graham Allison's "Conceptual Models and the Cuba Missile Crisis," American
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Some evidence on this and some implications for the theory of mar-
kets and other forms of command and control structures are provided
by what has to the perception of systems analysis over the
past few years, in domestic programs. I think it fair to say
that in the mid-i 960's was a faith that with good analysis we could
reliably choose ex ante among alternative programs on the basis of data
gathered and analysis clone, even though these programs were in large
part untried and the had never before been adequately met. We
felt we could do this actually really observing the alternatives
in action. In effect the faith here was closely analogous to the economic
theorist's allegory the wide range of choices and circumstances
over which the firm can make rational choices ex ante. As experience
accumulated it became and clearer that there seldom was sufficient
information ex ante to make reliable bets, and that at the least ex ante
analysis had to be complemented by ex post evaluations. More recently of
course thinking about policy development has moved more and
more toward conscious experimentalism, with the role of the analyst seen
as that of setting up a number of experimental programs to obtain data
and to try them out, and then on the basis of later data generated in the
course of the program, selecting or modifying the menu of alternatives.2'
In short, the model of how public programs should be chosen has moved
from the rational choice ex ante paradigm to a paradigm which explicitly
recognizes that the problem is that of trying out new things, and getting
appropriate feedback fOr screening and selection.
There is no reason to believe the situation is much different in mar-
ket sectors. While public sector industries seem to have unusual diffi-
culties in selecting and spreading good innovations, in the private sector
as well as the public it seems necessary to characterize dynamic processes
and mechanisms of and diffusion in terms of a flow of
innovations, many of which are no improvement at all. Traditional theory
that relies heavily on e9uilibrium concepts seems to abstract from these
phenomena and their implications. A good dynamic industry model, I
suggest, incorporates a stripped down version of the theory of the firm
proposed in the preceding sections. Many people have granted that a
quasi-behavioral modela particular firm but
21 For an interesting essay in advocacy see D. Campbell, "Reforms as Experi-
ments," American April 1969. For a discussion on the context of the
negative income tax see the articles by G. H. Orcutt and A. L. Orcutt, and by
G. H. Orcutt, H. W. Watts, and J. B. Edwards in American Economic Review,
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have doubted whether it can be incorporated into an industry model.
The claim here is that it can, indeed it is the natural model of the firm
to use in a model which includes the possibility of dynamic competition.
Firms are characterized by their technologies and static decision rules,
and also by the way they generate innovations, expand or contract as a
function of their profitability, and imitate (successful) innovations of
others. What are the required components of a theory of command and
control structure (competition) in an environment where rapid tech-
nological change is desired or occurring? The objective is to model de-
mands and competitive pressures in a way that fits our proposed general
model, that is consonant with traditional theory where that is appropri-
ate, but which also characterizes more adequately a dynamic, changing
environment where that is appropriate.
First, there has to be much more sophistication in modeling the
demand for innovation. There are significant problems in positive model-
ing. It cannot simply be assumed that there is a well-perceived demand
curve. One has to get a realistic specification of the speed with which
consumers assess the plusses and minuses of the new innovation and of
how, in turn, this affects the signals and profitability of the innovating
firm. There also are some major normative issues. In a dynamic environ-
ment itis doubtful that consumers immediately assess accurately the
properties of the new products—there are real issues to be considered re-
garding the effectiveness of consumer evaluation procedures. While econ-
omists increasingly are looking at problems of externalities, these would
appear to warrant even more consideration in an environment where
rapid change is occurring. There may be something to the argument that
with enough time, forces of self-interest will cope with the externalities
problem. However, the mechanisms that get externalities reflected in bar-
gains and in incentives to producers cannot be assumed to work quickly.
One would expect externalities to be rampant in an environment of rapid
technical change.
Second, the dynamics of interactive behavior of the group of firms
in the sector needs to be modeled quite carefully. The analysis needs to
trace through the manner in which the responses of consumers to an
innovation, and of the innovating firm to the success of its innovation,
change the environment for other firms and in turn affect their behavior,
which feeds back, etc.22 The nature of the expansion and contraction
22 For an interesting approach to certain aspects of this, but within a maxi-
mization context, see F. M. Scherer, "Research and Development Resource Allo-
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and entry-and-exit behavior of the firms clearly is an important charac-
teristic of the dynamic sector environment. In addition to asking the
extent to which improved performance gets reflected in higher profit, one
must ask how sensitive are expansion and contraction rates to profit-
ability (using the terma general proxy for whatever the organization
aims for)? How sensitive are entry rates to the average profitability of
established firms? Are limits on firm size or (more saliently) on the
extent to which particular firms can and will use a particular technology
or innovation? To the extent that expansion rates are not particularly
sensitive to profit orthere are sharp limits on ultimate size, the
efficiency of dynamic response is deterred directly and, also, indirectly
because (under plausible models) less pressure is put on the noninno-
vators. One is to conjecture that sectors in which individual
organizations are geographically (schools?) provide a less
dynamically environment than those in which growth of any
particular organization is not closely bounded. On the other hand, if
expansion work quickly and powerfully and imitation
mechanisms sluggishly, ksuccessfulinnovator will become a monopolist.
In any case it would seem that analysis of this kind of question is impor-
tant in studies of any particular sector.
Successful innovations spread in part through growth of the inno-
vators, in part through imitation. It is apparent that in market sectors
both mechanisms are at work, although the relative importance of each
does not appear to have been studied much and probably varies from
sector to sector. It is important to note that the two mechanisms are
not independent. In public or nonprofit sectors the "expansion of the
innovator" mechanism is largely or totally scotched. This means that a
desirable innovation be spread without imitation. At the same
time it means that little or no spur is put to organizations to adopt inno-
vations; there is no build-up of competitive pressure on the public
monopoly.
There are some compensating considerations. In particular, while
the incentive to imitate is weakened when the innovating unit cannot or
will not expand, at same time there is under these circumstances
no incentive for the toto deter imitation (in the private
sector, for example, deterrence is the function of the patent system).
Organizations that expand, and that know others cannot either,
have little to gain by preventing others from adopting their own success-
ful practices. Much of the still remaining faith in the ability to diffuse
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lack of any clear-cut profitlike incentive and despite the existence of sharp
boundaries on organizational size, rests on a faith in the apparatus for
generating imitation. However, we know precious little about diffusion
mechanisms, and patterns of a sector should be a prime topic for in-
vestigation in studies of industrial organization in an environment of
change. 23
If one can assume that the speed of consumer response and strength
of feedback to suppliers for better or lower-priced products is great
enough, that expansion and contraction rules are sensitive enough to
profit, and that imitation mechanisms work quickly and reliably relative
to the pace at which innovations occur, then it seems reasonable to
model the environment in terms of equilibrium conditions. But in a
world of rapid innovation, one must pay explicit attention to the
transients.24 It does seem possible to develop a general model that is
capable of generating competition either in the neoclassical sense or as
Schumpeter described it, depending on what one assumes about key
parameter values; and which kind of competition it is in any particular
sector clearly makes a difference, both in terms of positive description
and analysis, and in terms of the major public policy issues to watch
out for.
POLICY ISSUES
In this concluding section I will discuss, in summary form, two major
policy issues involving industrial organization in a regime of actual, or
desired, rapid technological change. These are worth discussing not only
for their own sake, but also for the opportunity they afford to develop
further in a concrete setting some of the points made abstractly in the
preceding two sections. The first involves issues that arise in trying to
program very rapid technological advance in particular sectors. The
second involves problems of generating, selecting, and diffusing innova-
tion in public sector or mixed industries.
23 There have been several first-rate economic studies. See, for example, the
several chapters on diffusion in E. Mansfield, Industrial Research and Technologi-
cal Innovation, New York, Norton, 1968. However, there has been very little solid
work on "mechanisms."
24 Obviously this is one of Herbert Simon's central points in his "Theories
of Decision Making in Economics and Behavioral Science," American Economic
Review, June 1959, and in many of the other papers he has written in criticism
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Programing of Rapid Technological Advance
As remarked earlier, in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy
Schumpeter presented the vision of a future world in which major inno-
vation was routinized. In his New Industrial State Gaibraith suggests that
this stage essentially now has been reached in the large American
corporations, and Serván-Schreiber takes a similar position regarding
practice in the United States as a whole. The economist's standard model
incorporating R and D likewise is consonant with this perception, treat-
ing R and D as basically an investment decision not unlike most others.
The theoretical restructuring proposed in the preceding section
conflicts strongly with this point of view. In several places I insisted that
the innovation process not be modeled as objectively rational either in
the sense that outcomes can be closely predicted in advance or in the
sense that outside experts (the economists?) would agree on the predic-
tions. In this connection, I insisted that a good fraction of innovations
are not improvements. In the industry modeling of technical change I
rested considerable weight on the generation of a variety of innovations
and hence on of ex post evaluation and selection.
This about the nature of the innovation process is
important not only for modeling but also for policy. If one believes in
the theory of the routinization of innovation—R and D as investment—
then one soon is looking to R and D, focused on particu-
lar national problems, as not just a promising but a reliable instrument
for public policy. Further, belief in the reliability of the instrument
naturally leads one to in advance the range of alternatives, pick
the one that looks and put his chips on it. If, on the other hand,
one believes •that R a "let a
thousand flowers bloom" point of view, sees R and D as an interesting,
perhaps highly promising, policy instrument, but does not treat the
instrument as reliable and, hence, hedges both by using other instru-
ments and by spreading the R and D bets. The first approach leads to
the Defense Department style of R and D, and to such forced-paced
programs as the supersonic transport and the breeder reactor of the
Atomic Energy Commission. The second perception leads one, in public
sectors, to spreading of funds, such as is done by the National Institutes
of Health, and in private sectors, to seeking to encourage a diversity of
research and development, private as well as public.25
25Clearly,the discussion here harks back to the earlier work done by Burton
Klein and others on military R and D. See his articles and also A. W. Marshall54 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
The mutation-selection model seems much more consonant with
history. One of the most striking impressions of the history of techno-
logical advance in most American industries is the diversity of sources.
New products, processes, inputs, and equipment for an industry have
come from many different firms in the industry, suppliers, purchasers,
new. entrants to the industry, outside individual inventors. Many develop-
ments that early seemed very promising did not pan out. Many important
breakthroughs were relatively unexpected and were not supported by the
experts in the field. While detailed histories are not plentiful, and many
of these do not shed light on the question, one has the impression that
in most of the technically progressive industries, like chemicals and
electronics, most of the bad bets were rather quickly abandoned, particu-
larly if someone else was coming up with a better solution, and good
ideas generally could proceed along a variety of paths to get their case
heard.
The military research and development programs since the mid-
1950's, the civilian reactor program of the Atomic Energy Commission,
and experience to date with the supersonic transport, are a sad con-
trast. In these areas the early batting average has been dismal, just as it
has been in the domain of decentralized development. But there has
been a proclivity to stick with the game plan, despite mounting evidence
that it is not a good one. In areas where R and D was more decentralized
and competitive, such persistence appears only in exceptional cases. The
case of Convair throwing good money after bad on the 880 development
rightly is regarded as an aberration, and the fact that General Dynamics
had learned its style in military R and D undoubtedly was a contributing
factor. But this kind of occurrence is the rule, not the exception, in mili-
tary R and D. The B-58 and TFX were pushed all the way through
development despite mounting unfavorable evidence. The B-70 and
Skybolt were halted short of procurement but long after the signals were
clear that they were bad ideas. It is a good bet that Boeing would not
have persisted so long in pushing its swing wing SST design had the
bulk of the funds been its own and had it the expectations of a market
test against alternatives. I think the signals are clear enough that the
and W. H. Meckling, "Predictability of the Costs, Time, and Success of Develop-
ment," and the Comment by F. M. Scherer on Klein's "The Decision Making
Problem in Development," in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity:
Economic and Social Factors, Universities-NBER Conference Series, Vol.13,
Princeton University Press for NBER, 1962. For a formalization, see my "Un-
certainty, Learning, and the Economics of Parallel R & D Projects," Review of
Economics and Statistics, November 1959. The discussion below is heavily com-
pressed from a forthcoming paper by George Eads and myself.Industrial Organization 55
presentdesign is in trouble. It is the monopoly position and lack of
pressure from an that carries the project forward inits
present conception. Similarly, throughout the history of the AEC's
power reactor there have been complaints that the AEC was
persisting in R and D On designs long after evidence had accumulated
that this was not an route, and conversely, that the AEC has
been very sticky about initiating work on new concepts.
The problem transcends the likely inefficiency and high cost of
innovation in industries where the mutation-selection model is not ap-
plied. These sectorslikely to end up with a far too limited range
of choice and, further, with the government as a powerful lobbyist for
the particular technologies. It is rather surprising that the producers of
coal and oil, and of power-generating equipment using conventional
fuels, have not raised more noise than they have regarding the pressure
being applied to the utjlities by the AEC to install nuclear rather than
conventional power. The evidence on the nature of thermal pollution
and nuclear waste problems now is far from clear. Even if it turns out
that these problems are more amenable to solution than the pollution
and waste problems by the use of conventional fuels, neverthe-
less, I think we should feel some discomfort that a strong government
lobby has a stake in the issue. There has been more vocal concern about
the implications of a governmental financial stake in the SST, perhaps
because of the explicit 'revenue-sharing provisions in the program. But
even without a financial stake, the higher executives and congressmen
who support the programs have a personal credibility stake in the suc-
cess of the products and processes they push so hard. It is fairly clear
that the success of the SST program, measured in almost any dimension
that has been talked abbut, will depend greatly on the fare structure as
allowed and encouraged by the Civil Aeronautics Board. The CAB can
go a long way toward thaking the SST program a financial success by
fighting for high fares (to cover the higher cost of the SST relative to the
jumbo jets) and uniform fares (so that the lower-cost technology will
not be able to in the dimension where it is strongest). These
are the kinds of one runs into, I suggest, when one tries
to predict and plan innovation closely, rather than viewing the innovation
process as one of mutation and selection.
The Problem of Achieving Dynamic Efficiency in the Public Sector
Earlier I madepoint that the problem of efficiency in public
sector activities is, in good part, a problem of industrial organization.56 EconomicResearch: Retrospect and Prospect
We economists have neglected this perspective before because we have
been inattentive to the way that public goods or services are provided.
Implicitly we have assumed that once the public decision was made (we
spent a lot of attention on how that should be done) it was as good as
effected. It now is clear that the public decision (even assuming there is
such a clean-cut thing) has to be treated like a "demand" in the theory
of industrial behavior, for the appropriate actions usually must be drawn
forth from institutions—often some private as well as public—who can-
not be assumed to jump simply because the President or a Cabinet
Secretary says to jump; and very often the institutional structure pro-
vides the President or the public with limited alternative sources or with
none; there is no real competitive mechanism.
The combination of the demand characteristics of public sector
activities and the organizational structure of the sector apparently yield
serious problems in a dynamic environment. I think most of us would
agree that the dynamic performance of too large a fraction of the publi.c
and nonpublic sector has been extremely poor. While I have not collected
any numbers and don't even know what numbers I should collect, my
impression is that the average public sector batting average is much worse
than the performance, on average, of sectors where the command and
control mechanism is based on a real market for final products which
links consumer satisfaction rather tightly to the profit or other success
measures of the firms.
The problem is not characterized by inadequate research and devel-
opment (although in some sectors, for example, education or urban serv-
ices, this may be the case). In both defense and health there has been
a lot of R and D, and technical change has been extremely rapid; but it
also has been extremely expensive and poorly screened. My remarks
above on the proclivity for expensive failures in defense research and
development apply. In health one has the strong impression that one of
the reasons for rising health costs has been the proclivity of doctors
and hospitals to adopt almost any plausible new thing—drugs, surgical
methods, equipment—that increases capability in any dimension (and
some for which even that isn't clear) without regard to cost.
The basic problem appears tO reside in the screening and spreading
mechanism and seems inherent in a sector where for a variety of reasons
full-blown consumer sovereignty is not possible or desirable and itis
difficult to specify a set of clear-cut performance measures on which
people can agree. Most of the traditional discussion, however, has been
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toargue that if the w9rld is like Schumpeter's circular flow, one can
conceive of a variety of mechanisms that ultimately can move the deci-
sion rules of a public or nonprofit firm toward those which reflect the
public interest. The adjustment process clearly would be slow but it
would get you there. I am arguing that the serious problems of
these feedback systems is
is
How do we go about improving the performance of our educational
system? The answer is not clear. Evidently we want to get more new
approaches and tried out and evaluated. It seems plausible
that the design and funding of major experiments should be undertaken
at the federal level. But 'how does one really "evaluate"? Should success
or failure be judged basis of how well children or their parents
like the program? We long have been leary of putting too much weight
on this for a variety of reasons. What objective scores are relevant?
Clearly this is I maintain that with enough time and experi-
mentation with a fixed of alternatives, and easy modifications,
it would be possible to get widespread agreement. But, I repeat, this
takes time, and by the time we know how to evaluate the last block of
alternatives we are a new block of alternatives and conditions.
This point is in considering the new federal ventures toward
educational reform. Th& nation clearly is beginning to put together the
apparatus for running a lot of experiments, which seems to me an advance
in how to generate an interesting spectrum of innovations. Two other
proposed new departures recognize the problem of command and con-
trol over autonomous and cut at it from antithetical points of
view. The educational voucher idea tries to build up the power of con-
sumer sovereignty, and suffers from the variety of worries (alluded to
above) we have about this. The performance contracting route attempts
to increase the motivating power of those who think they can set objec-
tive standards, and indirebtly to increase incentives to imitate the experi-
mental programs that sFore well by these standards. However, the
difficulties discussed above remain. As an in-between version one might
well think of a voucher1 system, complemented by widely publicized
evaluation of schools' performances, carried out according to the pro-
posed relevant measures and intended to educate and inform parents. All
of these are important changes. They clearly will help to make
the system more responsive and progressive if we can solve the problem
of evaluation, of good departures from poor ones. But the
"if" is basic, and the soluçion to this is not going to be easy.58 EconomicResearch: Retrospect and Prospect
These remarks were focused on education so that they would be
specific, but I suggest they are applicable to a wide range of public
and nonprofit sectors. I make them not because I have a solution, but
rather in the hope that the appreciative theory of the problem may be
useful, and because I think it extremely important that more economists
be working on these problems.